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BICENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT-
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, FUTURE
INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
TOM C. CLRK*
In one of his Federalist Papers, James Madison wrote: "Justice is the
end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and
ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the
pursuit." I We Americans presently are celebrating our 200th year
of such pursuit; still we have not attained our goal. It is helpful, how-
ever, in this our bicentennial year, to pause to study the beginnings
of this quest, and it is most fitting that such meditation be sparked by
the Symposium on constitutional government offered by the William
and Mary Law Review. No publication can lay claim to a more auspi-
cious heritage than can this Review, for its lineage goes back to the
great intellectuals who not only forged the principles of our consti-
tutional government but put them on parchment for all of God's
creatures to emulate.
A quartet of learned professors brings to us their comprehension of
our constitutional beginnings and of the domestic and international
implications of this heritage. Professor Hood Phillips leads the Sym-
posium with "The British Constitution: From Revolution to Devolu-
tion," 2 Professor Ammerman follows with "The British Constitution
and the American Revolution: A Failure of Precedent," 3 Professor
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Retired. Tazewell
Taylor Visiting Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, 1975-76.
1. THE FEDERnisT No. 51, at 324 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
2. 17 WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 423 (1976).
3. 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 473 (1976).
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Swindler then deals with the "Seedtime of an American Judiciary: From
Independence to the Constitution," and Professor Humphrey traces the
development of "The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Imple-
mentation." 5 In the words of Walt Whitman, these dissertations illu-
strate the "evolutionary outcome" 6 not only of English tradition but
of English bull-headedness as well. At the same time, the articles give
us a picture of early American life as seen through its constitutional
window, a perception that has been imparted through the United Na-
tions back across the oceans of the entire world. The shapings of our
political foundations, as traced by Professors Hood Phillips and Ammer-
man, and the early development of our unique judicial system, as re-
lated by Dr. Swindler, furnish a perfect gateway to the present inter-
national effort of which Dr. Humphrey writes.
H. L. Mencken said that nothing-including man-endures for more
than a generation. He was bent on liquidating the past. Others say
that we new Americans have lost the old world culture of our fore-
bears. In my opinion, both views are wrong. Rather than being com-
posed of cultural tramps, our generations sparkle with achievements in
political science, literature, and law, as evidenced by this Symposium.
These distinguished scholars completely demolish Mr. Mencken's theory
by use of the experiences of generation after generation of peoples as
stepping stones to the attainment of a more effective and equal admin-
istration of justice under law. Certainly, as Mr. Madison said, "[L] iberty
may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses
of power . . ." 7; thus, the Founders sought to reconcile the yearning
for individual liberty with the necessities of law and order. In short,
as Mr. Madison emphasized, in a free society the government not only
must be able to control the governed but also it must be obliged to con-
trol itself." Failure in the latter, as we have recently experienced, in-
evitably destroys the efficacy of the former.
The concept of constitutionalism is not of modern origin. Ancient
Greece gave us some of the basic characteristics of constitutionalism, one
of which was that acts of government be judged according to a standard
4. 17 Wm. & MARY L. Rnv. 503 (1976).
5. 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 527 (1976).
6. "As America fully and fairly construed is the legitimate result and evolutionary
outcome of the past. .. ." W. WHITMAN, A Backward Glance O'er Travel'd Roads,
in 2 CouLECrM WTMNGs oF WALT WHITMAN 721 (F. Stovall ed. 1964).
7. THE Fa DERas.isr No. 63, at 387 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
8. See id. No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison).
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of quality. Even though by that standard the law be bad, it was not
illegitimate. The Romans adhered to the principle that the people
alone were the source of law and continued to accept this doctrine
even when Caesar's will became Roman law.
Medieval kings claimed to be chosen by God and accountable only
to him, as James I asserted in 1598 in The Trew Law of Free Mon-
archies9 The Church of England also taught the divine right of Kings;
James I articulated its doctrine in an address to Parliament: "Kings are
in the word of GOD it selfe, called Gods, as being his Lieutenants and
Vice-gerents on earth, and so adorned and furnished with some sparkles
of the Divinitie . ,, 20 The people owed allegiance to the person of
the King; in Calvin's Case, the idea was spawned that Scots were under
the personal dominion of the King, rather than under the authority of
the Parliament.1 The power of the King was absolute in his sphere; at
the same time, however, he was not to transgress the sphere of private
right that sprang from Magna Carta. From the conflicts between divine
right and private right emerged the doctrine that the Crown was re-
sponsible not only to God but to the law. Parliament, as Dr. Hood
Phillips points out, began assuming duties and rights formerly enjoyed
by the King, and in the following century most of the present rela-
tionships between the two were effected.
The American colonies, in comparison with other British territories,
enjoyed considerable independence. The concepts of constitutionalism,
embodying freedom, proved too much, however, and dissension in-
creased rapidly during the time of James I and his immediate successors.
The issue of the legitimacy of parliamentary action as well as that of
the King's representatives brought on a crisis that was incapable of
resolution through negotiation. Professor Ammerman discusses the
reasons for the failure of stare decisis that led to revolution.
After achieving independence, the colonists found it necessary to
have a written constitution. In America there were no centuries of
precedent as England enjoyed; the creation of a single written document
that would bind all was, indeed, a monumental task. The genius of
the resulting document is that it achieves a delicate balance between
permanence and flexibility. The proof of high attainment in this regard
is the comparatively small number of amendments that have been found
9. THF POLTCAL WORKS OF JAMES I at 53 (C. Mclwain ed. 1918).
10. JAMES 1, Speech of 160Y to Parliament, in id. at 281.
11, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 7 Co. Rep. la. (Ex. 1608).
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necessary: only 26. Statesmer %and scholars alike hail the result as the
major contribution to constitutional government in history.
The language of the Soviet Constitution recognizes and honors all of
the fundamental rights that are the essential elements of a free society.'2
In application, however, these rights cherished by all freedom-loving
people are recognized only in the breach. This is because the Soviet
judicial system is not a separate, equal, and coordinate branch, but is
dominated by the Politburo.13 Our Founders were aware of the pitfalls
of a judiciary that is not a separate branch of government. Indeed, in
the Declaration of Independence they objected strenuously to the in-
fluence of the King on British courts.14 In writing our Constitution,
therefore, they made the judicial branch secure as the third equal, sep-
arate, and coordinate system.15 Dr. Swindler traces the steps that the
Founders took to prevent a repetition of these grievances. Beginning
with the closing of the Royal Courts, he describes the development of
the Judiciary Act of 1789,16 the most important piece of legislation ever
adopted by Congress; with remarkably few changes,17 it stands in its
original form as a bulwark of protection to the freedom of the people.
12. SovErsKAiA KoNsrrrsxu (Constitution) arts. 118 (right to work), 119 (right to
rest and leisure), 122 (equal rights for women), 123 (equal rights despite race and
nationality), 124 (freedom of religion), 125 (freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and
street demonstration), 126 (right to unite in mass organizations), 127 (inviolability of
the person), 128 (inviolability of homes) (U.S.S.R., 1936).
13. Id. arts. 104, 113, 114.
14. "The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated
injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute
Tyranny over these States.. . -He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by
refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.-He has made Judges
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and pay-
ment of their salaries." U.S. DECLAmR-ON oF INDIEPENDENCE par. 2 (1776).
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, S§ 1-2; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) (Marshall, C.J.): "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial
department, to say what the law is."
16. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
17. The judicial structure established by the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73,
is similar to the current system. The Act created 13 district courts with limited
original jurisdiction and 3 circuit courts with original jurisdiction in diversity and
criminal cases and appellate jurisdiction in civil cases. Further, a Supreme Court was
vested with original jurisdiction as provided for in the Constitution, with appellate
jurisdiction over federal circuit courts if the amount in question exceeded $2000, and
with appellate jurisdiction over state court controversies raising a federal question. The
Act also provided for removal from state to federal courts in certain cases and incor-
porated the Rules of Decision Act, directing federal courts to use applicable state law.
Although the federal court system has,,been changed many times, as to revise juris-
dictional limits, only a few amendments since the Judiciary Act are of major signifi-
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It was only natural as well as human that, upon the cessation of hos-
tilities in World War II, statesmen began thinking of the extension of
constitutional government to world affairs. The result was the Charter
of the United Nations."' Although Woodrow Wilson failed in a similar
effort after World War I, world leaders have been able to maintain at
least an international sounding board through the United Nations. In
addition, the International Bill of Rights, encompassing the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights1" and its implementing Covenants,2" has
been promulgated under the authority of the United Nations. As a
member of the President's Commission for the Observance of Human
Rights Year (1968), I was privileged to observe firsthand the progress
made in the area of international human rights. As Dr. Humphrey
portrays, there are those among us who prayed for more accomplish-
ment. The Connally Amendment 2 and other obstacles, however, have
cance. Original federal question jurisdiction first was granted to the federal courts
in 1875, Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Star. 470; the current circuit courts of
appeals were created in 1891 by the Evarts Act, Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26
Stat. 826; the circuit courts instituted by the Judiciary Act of 1789 were abolished, and
their jurisdiction transferred to the district courts, by the adoption of the Judicial Code
in 1911, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Star. 1091; the direct review jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court largely was replaced by discretionary review by writ of certiorari,
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, S 237, 43 Stat. 936. See C. WiurnT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF FEDERAL CouRrs § 1 (2d ed. 1970).
18. June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
19. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
20. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
21. In 1946, the United States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, which was established by the United Nations Charter, in legal
disputes concerning interpretation of treaties, questions of international law, breaches
of international obligations, and the nature and extent of reparations for such breaches,
by filing a declaration under article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Star. 1055, 1060 (1945), T.S. No. 933. As originally written,
however, the Senate resolution giving its consent to the declaration contained a proviso
that the declaration did not apply to disputes regarding matters "essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States"; the Connally Amendment to the resolution
further limited the jurisdiction of the court by reserving to the United States the au-
thority to decide what matters lay within its domestic jurisdiction. The resolution as
amended stated that the declaration did not apply to "disputes with regard to matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States as deter-
mined by the United States." The resolution incorporating the Connally Amendment
was passed by the Senate on August 2, 1946. S. Res. 196, 79th Cong, 2d Sess, 92 CON;.
Rac. 10706 (1946). The declaration under article 36(2) appears at 61 Stat. 1218 (1946).
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prevented the United States from participating in an effective system
of international implementation. When the Covenants to the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights come into force, those states that are parties will
be bound to respect the human rights protected by the Covenants. Un-
fortunately, no implementation or enforcement machinery has been
adopted, and none is in the offing.
It is hoped that this Symposium, by bringing attention to the develop-
ment of constitutional government since the Revolution, in this, the
200th year of our independence, will prove beneficial to the continual
struggle to attain equal justice under law for all peoples throughout
the world.
See generally Henkin, The Connally Reservation Revisited and, Hopefully,. Contained,
65 AM. J. INAr'L L. 374 (1971).
